About
About this site and its sources
What this site is, what it is not, the sources it was checked against, the sister sites, and which statements are protocol requirements, ecosystem patterns or this site's own recommendations.
This is a knowledge site about the Model Context Protocol as an engineering decision. It starts from one plain function that reads a roof assessment and climbs to a remote MCP server shared by four teams, asking at every step what the step adds and who is allowed to do what. It is written for engineers who build agents, backend engineers who will host capabilities for them, and architects and platform teams who must decide between a function, an HTTP API and MCP, and then govern what they chose.
One example runs through every page. An insurer receives a broker's request for a quote. An underwriting agent gathers evidence from an assessment service and recommends; a human underwriter decides. Claims, support and analytics teams reach the same assessment service through one MCP server. The model recommends; a person decides.
What it is and is not#
| It is | It is not |
|---|
| A decision guide: when a function, an HTTP API or MCP is the simplest right answer, with the trade-offs stated | An argument that MCP is always better, or a setup tutorial for one product |
One running example with the series cases (UW-004, UW-005, UW-006, UW-009) and this site's own cases UW-M01 to UW-M12 | A record of any real insurer. Cases, rules, teams, tokens and the provider are invented |
| A demonstration of mechanism: discovery, calls, token validation, per-call authorization, audit, lifecycle, written as small runnable code | A measurement of any model, server or product. No page reports latency, throughput or quality figures |
| Protocol and products described from their own documentation, read on 2026-11-18 | A ranking or a buying guide. No product is called best, and no price is quoted |
| Labelled statements: normative requirements, ecosystem patterns and this site's recommendations kept apart | A substitute for the specification. Read it before you build |
Three kinds of statement#
The owner's specification for this site asked that protocol requirements, optional ecosystem patterns and personal architectural advice never blur. Pages use three bold lead-ins when the difference matters:
| Label | Means | Example |
|---|
Normative (MCP specification 2026-07-28) | A requirement of the specification (or an RFC it cites), linked in the page's fact log | A server must not pass through the token it received to another service |
| Ecosystem pattern | What SDKs, gateways, registries, identity products or the community commonly do; optional | A gateway in front of several MCP servers that validates tokens centrally |
| This site's recommendation | The author's design advice; never called "the standard" | Every new consumer gets its own client id, rate limit and metrics |
What is original here and what is not#
| Part | Status |
|---|
Host, client, server, tools, resources, prompts, server/discover, transports, authorization | The Model Context Protocol specification, revision 2026-07-28, described from the specification. Not copied |
| OAuth 2.1 (draft), protected resource metadata (RFC 9728), resource indicators (RFC 8707), token exchange (RFC 8693), authorization server metadata (RFC 8414) | Published standards and drafts, described from their texts |
| Enterprise-managed authorization | An official MCP extension, described from its blog post and specification |
| Security threats and mitigations | From the MCP security best practices and a government cybersecurity information sheet on MCP, used with attribution |
| The five-architecture ladder, the decision table's wording, the RACI matrix, the lifecycle states, the playbooks and ADRs | Written for this site, from common practice in service engineering and the owner's specification. Called designs and recommendations on the pages |
The assessment service, the MCP server uw-assessment, the principals, teams, tokens and the twelve UW-M cases | Written for this site. All synthetic |
| The example code, its tests, the Java program | Written for this site |
| The interactive labs and the diagrams | Written for this site. The labs' logic is a second implementation of the Python code, and a parity test fails if the two differ |
How the facts were checked#
| Kind of claim | How it was checked |
|---|
| The protocol, a product or a standard | Read in its own documentation on 2026-11-18 and logged with the address and date in the page's fact log (docs/facts/ in the repository). Where the documentation is silent, the page says so. Surprising items, such as a protocol change or a moved page, were fetched a second time before publication |
| The example | Run. Every command shown from examples/uw-mcp/ was executed in a copy of the folder, and the output on the page is the output it printed |
| The Java program | Run with JDK 23 as java AssessmentService.java. Spring, Bean Validation, Pydantic and the official MCP Java SDK are shown as documented shape; not run here |
| The labs | They read data generated from the example; a parity test checks that the JavaScript gives the same results as the Python |
| Links and structure | A build step checks every internal link, diagram, glossary reference, JSON block and Python block before the site is published |
One source needs a note. The NSA's cybersecurity information sheet on MCP returned HTTP 403 from its official address on the day of reading. It was read from an Internet Archive copy of that same address, saved on 2026-11-17, and the pages that cite it say so. Treat every statement about a product or protocol as true on the day it was read; in this field documentation changes monthly.
What the example does not show#
The insurance example is an illustrative reconstruction for teaching. It follows the shape of a real project by the author, but the cases, rules, fields, teams, tokens, provider and every number are invented. Nothing here reports the quality of a real system or model. Example roof thresholds are synthetic, not insurance practice.
The model here is a scripted stand-in, so these results show how the protocol and the controls work, not how good any model is.
| In the example | What it really is |
|---|
| The agents' models | Scripts that emit requests. No model is called. There is no external network and no key |
| The MCP server and client | A teaching subset of MCP revision 2026-07-28 over stdio and HTTP, written from the specification. Not the official SDK, not conformance tested |
| The HTTP stages | Servers bound to the machine's loopback address for the length of one run |
| Tokens and the identity provider | Toy tokens signed with HMAC from Python's standard library, and a stand-in issuer and token exchange. Not a real OAuth server, not a JWT library, not secure for production |
| The database | SQLite from Python's standard library, with an authorizer callback standing in for database grants |
| Times and counts | A simulated clock and a scripted workload; every run prints the same values |
The sister sites#
This site is one of a series on AI-native engineering. Each owns one subject and links the others at the seams.
| Site | What it owns |
|---|
| prompt.sammuthu.com | Instructions: how they are written, composed and defended |
| context.sammuthu.com | What the model can see now: selection, retrieval, budget |
| rag.sammuthu.com | Retrieval from SQL rows to production: embeddings, vector indexes, hybrid search, reranking, grounding |
| memory.sammuthu.com | Durable information and saved execution state |
| tools.sammuthu.com | Callable capabilities: schema, execution, MCP tools |
| mcp.sammuthu.com | Shared capabilities across teams: when MCP is justified, identity, authorization, governance (this site) |
| a2a.sammuthu.com | Messages between agents; A2A versus MCP |
| observe.sammuthu.com | Logs, metrics, traces, audit events, replay |
| guardrails.sammuthu.com | Enforceable checks around a probabilistic agent |
| schema.sammuthu.com | Typed contracts: shape, validation, repair, evolution |
| orchestrate.sammuthu.com | The control plane: what runs next |
| reliable.sammuthu.com | Acceptable outcomes despite failures and load |
| harness.sammuthu.com | The runtime around a model call |
| eval.sammuthu.com | Measurement: graders, golden sets, release gates |
| diff-to-deploy.sammuthu.com | Shipping a change with coding agents |
Sources and reading list#
Each link below was opened on 2026-11-17 or 2026-11-18. The fact logs in the repository list every claim with the exact page it came from.
The protocol#
| Source | Why read it |
|---|
| Model Context Protocol specification and the changelog of revision 2026-07-28 | Architecture, discovery, tools, resources, prompts, transports. Read the changelog first if you learned MCP before mid-2026 |
| MCP authorization | Protected resource metadata, authorization server discovery, resource indicators, token validation, the passthrough prohibition |
| MCP security best practices | Confused deputy, token passthrough, SSRF, state handle hijacking, local server compromise, scope minimization |
| MCP extensions and enterprise-managed authorization, with its announcement | How extensions are staged; the enterprise identity provider as the authority for MCP access |
| MCP Registry | Publishing and discovering servers; namespaces |
Standards the protocol builds on#
Security guidance and products#
SDKs#
Who wrote it#
Written by Sam Muthu, an engineer who builds agentic systems. The example follows the shape of a real project by the author; everything in it is synthetic. Corrections are welcome.